














Does a Child Penalty Exist in the Post-apartheid 
South African Labour Market? 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Commerce in partial fulfilment 





Sibahle Siphokazi Sinalo Magadla 
(Student Number: MGDSIP008 ) 
 
Supervisors: Professor Murray Leibbrandt 
Professor Haroon Bhorat 
Plagiarism Declaration: 
 
1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend that it is 
your own. 
 
2. Each significant contribution and quotation from the works of other people has been 
attributed, cited and referenced. 
 
3. I certify that this submission is all our own work. 
 
4. I have not allowed and will not allow anyone to copy this essay with the intention of 




Signature: SSS Magadla 



















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
2  
Does a Child Penalty Exist in the Post-apartheid 
South African Labour Market? 
 
 
Sibahle Siphokazi Sinalo Magadla 




This study examines whether there exists a motherhood (or child) penalty for female employees 
in post-apartheid South Africa using three cross sections of data between 2001 and 2007. The 
Mincerian regression results indicate that a motherhood penalty exists, ceteris paribus. Using 
unconditional quantile regressions (RIF-OLS) to analyse the wage returns along the wage 
distribution, the study finds that there exists a motherhood wage penalty at lower wage levels, 
but this effect wanes in prominence at higher wage quantiles. At higher wage levels, mothers 
earn higher wages than their child-free counterparts, especially if they are married. 
Furthermore, the study applies Oaxaca-Blinder type decompositions within the RIF framework 
to decompose changes in the motherhood wage gap along the distribution into explained and 
unexplained contributions related to a range of factors. The decomposition results indicate that 
at lower quantiles, the wages of mothers minus wages of non-mothers is negative, but the 
relationship alternates at higher quantiles. Moreover, majority of the wage differential 
between mothers and non-mothers is due to unexplained characteristics. This implies that there 
are additional relevant factors such as societal norms, selection effects into employment and 
behavioural characteristics to be considered when analysing women’s wage returns.  
 
Keywords: Motherhood wage gap; child penalty; wage differential; Mincerian regression; 
recentered influence function (RIF); decomposition; South Africa 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, women in South Africa represent 45.1% of the employed11 population (QLFS, 
2017). While women have come a long way in terms of gains in the labour market, they are 
still less likely to have successful careers than men (Bhorat & Goga, 2013), more so if they 
have children. Globally, women who participate in the labour market are susceptible to social 
norms and prejudices both inside and outside the workplace. As more women enter the labour 
force, topics such as childbearing and how the workplace adjusts to childbearing and child-
caring matter. 
Although many studies have investigated the gender wage gap in South Africa (Bhorat & 
Gogga, 2013; Bosch, 2015), none have analysed the motherhood wage gap, or penalty. There 
seems to exist a gap between the earnings of women with children versus the earnings of 
women without children. It is postulated that women with children tend to earn less than 
women without children. The motherhood pay gap is also known as the family or child wage 
gap, reflecting the fact that sometimes it measures the pay gap between mothers and non- 
mothers but, in most econometric studies, measures women without dependent children 
(Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015). The incidence of mothers earning less than non-mothers pulls 
the average earnings of women relative to men down, meaning that as long as working women 
bear children, one cannot expect the gender gap to narrow. Consequently, there is a growing 
tendency globally for career-minded and highly skilled women to postpone or even forgo child- 
bearing for the sake of career progression. 
The presence of children can affect the household dynamic for all members, but women tend 
to change their labour-market behaviour more drastically in response to a change in 
family/children size than men (Angrist & Evans, 1998). The case of South Africa is unique due 
to the high labour migration rates across provinces. Migrant worker females may respond to 
childbirth in a range of ways; for example, they might leave children in the care of relatives. 
Hence, outcomes of motherhood for Black South African women in particular tend to be more 
nuanced. 
Using the 2001, 2005 and 2007 Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, this study combines detailed 
wage decompositions with quantile regressions to analyse differences in wage outcomes for 
employed mothers/caregivers and non-mothers. Given the stark wage disparities in the 
South African labour market, this study provides a more nuanced understanding of wage 
                                                      
1 Narrow or strict definition of employment is used. 
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inequality determinants amongst women who tend to be more marginalized than their male 
counterparts. This study is henceforth structured in the following manner: Section 2 
provides a review of pertinent international and South African literature on women’s labour 
market outcomes. Section 3 discusses the data and presents the methodology. Section 4 
presents trends in women’s labour market characteristics with graphical illustrations of key 
variables of interest. Section 5 provides the model estimation results: firstly, the Mincerian 
(Mincer, 1974) regression is applied to understand the average magnitude of the motherhood 
wage penalty. Secondly, the linear Recentered Influence Function (RIF)-OLS regressions 
model wage returns for mothers and childless women along the wage distribution. Thirdly, 
using the Blinder-Oaxaca method on the RIF regressions, the section decomposes the wage 
gap between mothers and non-mothers into explained and unexplained parts along the 
distribution. Section 6 concludes by summarizing key findings of the study and flagging 
some important limitations. 
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2. Literature Review 
According to the United Nations report on gender and work (2015), on average, women  
spend three hours more per day than men on unpaid work such as childcare in developing 
countries and two hours more per day than men in developed countries. It is widely 
documented internationally that female employees without children earn higher wages than 
female employees with children, even after controlling for measurable characteristics related 
to their productivity. There are various possible explanations for why mothers are more likely 
to earn lower wages than other women. According to the rationalist economics (human 
capital) approach, time spent at home for childcare interrupts work experience; and mother-
friendly jobs offer lower wages (Budig & England, 2001). Under the sociological approach, 
employers may hold stereotypes that mothers are distracted or less productive at work due to 
exhaustion from childcare during leisure hours; so employers may just blatantly discriminate 
against mothers (ibid.). The third framework is a comparative institutionalist approach which 
aims to identify the societal specific causes of inter-country patterns in motherhood pay gaps, 
paying attention to gender relations and intersections with welfare, education and 
employment institutions (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015). Most studies regarding the motherhood 
penalty focus on a combination of the rationalist economist and sociological approaches. 
The motherhood pay gap may be related to a productivity differential, or statistical 
discrimination. In the context of the former case, Becker’s worker effort hypothesis claims that 
firms aim to maximize worker effort per hour given earnings subject to their production 
functions (Becker, 1977). On the other hand, workers maximize utility by allocating time     
a nd  e f f o r t  to different activities, subject to their household production functions. Women 
with children will either choose to pay for childcare or take care of children themselves 
during leisure hours at home. The preference or choice may be contingent on the wage levels 
they earn. Due to this energy split between parenting and work, motherhood might be 
expected to reduce women’s productivity on the job, thus affecting pay. In the latter case of 
discrimination, employers might deem mothers less productive assuming the generic 
parenting arrangement where women bear childcare over men. Women with children may 
therefore incur a penalty in terms of employment and/or wages. The motherhood pay gap may 
be due to various other reasons. Many mothers respond to competing demands of 
employment and childrearing by relaxing their attachment to paid work (Gornick, et al., 
1998). For example, they may engage in part-time employment, or reduce working hours or 
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change occupations completely. 
The estimates in most studies refer to an adjusted wage gap, i.e. the size of the motherhood 
wage gap controlling for differences in characteristics important for productivity (such as age, 
education, industry, occupation, firm characteristics, etc.) (Staff & Mortimer, 2012). Staff and 
Mortimer (2012) shed some light on the motherhood wage penalty early in women’s 
occupational careers using fixed effects analysis on longitudinal data for 486 women followed 
from ages 19 to 31 in the Minnesota Youth Development Study. They observe that accumulated 
months out of the labour force and also not enrolled in school explain to some extent the 
residual pay gap of approximately 5% between mothers and non-mothers (ibid.). Nicodemo 
(2009) estimates family gaps along the wage distribution in the case of European households. 
The author finds that the reason for the family gap is that, when married, wives and husbands 
have the same characteristics but wives suffer from two types of discrimination with respect to 
husbands: a lower wage for the same work and also primary responsibility for children. 
Likewise, Budig and England (2001) use longitudinal data with a fixed effects model over the 
1982 to 1993 period in the United States to find a motherhood wage penalty of 7% per child. 
The authors also discover in their analysis that penalties are larger for married women than for 
unmarried women. 
The fact that a woman has a child implies that she may have taken some time off work, meaning 
that she may be negatively affected in the long run due to work experience foregone to take 
care of children. Using random effects and fixed effects regressions, Jia and Dong (2013) 
investigate how the economic transition has affected the wage gap between mothers and 
childless women in urban China using panel data for the period 1990–2005. The results reveal 
that on average, mothers earned considerably less than childless women during that period. 
significant at the 5% level) over the Chinese market-oriented economic reform period. More 
precisely, motherhood decreased women’s hourly wages by 45.1% (statistically significant at 
the 5% level) over the Chinese market-oriented economic reform period. 
Vinkenburg et al. (2012) study the motherhood bias which is the phenomenon where those 
making hiring and promotion decisions in organisational settings hold lower expectations 
regarding the professional commitment and competence of mothers. The authors conduct an 
experiment and discover that although women face a penalty for having children, their results 
uncover a wage premium for fathers (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015) as they tend to be expected 
to work even harder than before in order to provide for their growing families. Moreover, 
applying the quantile regression and decomposition approach along the wage distribution on 
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the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Waldfogel (1998) finds that in the United 
States between 1980 and 1991, having children had positive or no effects for men, but very 
strong negative effects for women. The author alludes to the idea that the family penalty 
disadvantages women more than men. To some extent, this explains why women with children 
tend to earn less than women without children. 
Motherhood has a varying impact on women’s career along their lifecycle (Kahn, et al., 2014). 
Analysing longitudinal survey data, Kahn et al. (2014) find that motherhood has the strongest 
negative labour market outcomes for women when they are younger and then attenuates when 
they are older (around age 50). However, for women with 3 or more children, the negative 
impacts persist across their life course. However, it should be kept in mind when considering 
these results that women who are married and have access to a husband’s sizable income may 
face different incentives for labour force participation and career advancement than do women 
who are unmarried or have low-earning husbands (ibid.). 
The penalty is usually heavier the younger the child. Using country fixed effects on women 
from 21 developing countries, Aguero et al. (2012) discover that the motherhood penalty 
diminishes as children age for low-skilled mothers. Authors stress the fact that amongst these 
lower educated mothers, effort and selection into different types of jobs, occupations and work 
intensity fully explain the family gap. 
Applying the Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition into explained and unexplained 
components on two British cohort studies, Joshi et al. (1999) discover that amongst full-time 
employees, women who put their employment on hold due to childbirth are subsequently paid 
less than childless women. In contrast, mothers who maintained employment continuity are as 
well paid as childless women, but neither are as well remunerated as men. Likewise, Gamboa 
and Zuluaga (2013) use the Nopo approach (an alternative to Oaxaca-Blinder) to decompose 
wage gap between mothers and non-mothers in Colombia into four components – three 
observables and one unexplained part of the gap. Results by the authors show that once 
schooling is included as a matching variable, the unexplained components of the gap narrow 
and become insignificant. This effect could speak to childbearing lowering further educational 
attainment for women and thus leading to lower wages. 
The motherhood bias may have a negative impact on women at various wage and skills levels. 
In other words, the size of the penalty may vary depending on the competency and commitment 
of the particular mother. A penalty may exist even towards high skilled (high wage) and career- 
oriented mothers. Using unconditional quantile regression models with person-fixed effects, 
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England et al. (2016) find that women with high skills and wages experience the highest total 
penalties for motherhood. The authors suggest that wage penalties can prevail just as much at 
low skill, low wage levels as at high wage levels. 
The sociological approach to understanding the motherhood pay gap argues that some 
employers may build into their hiring and promotion decisions traditional stereotypical 
expectations of the burdens imposed by families on mothers’ time and energy. This consequent 
undervaluation of women’s work means that skill and experience in female-dominated 
occupations and workplaces tend to be rewarded unfairly (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015). To 
demystify the question regarding whether motherhood actually affects workplace productivity 
and performance, Kalist (2008) investigates the motherhood penalty using panel data for a 
natural experiment on professional female golfers. He finds that productivity levels of women 
who eventually become mothers tend to increase in the years before giving birth and then 
declines thereafter. These results support the human-capital explanation and Becker’s effort 
hypothesis of the family gap. 
In spite of the productivity motivation for paying mothers less, a portion of the motherhood 
penalty still remains unexplained. Various authors have conducted behavioural studies to try 
explain workplace discrimination against mothers. Normative discrimination in particular is a 
form of bias which occurs when employers discriminate against mothers because they believe 
unconsciously, paid labour market success signals stereotypically masculine qualities such as 
assertiveness or dominance (Benard & Correll, 2010). This status-based discrimination occurs 
when individuals violate gendered expectations that mothers should prioritise family over paid 
work. Bernard and Correll (2010) determine whether mothers face normative discrimination 
by conducting a laboratory study where job applications for a high-status, highly paid 
professional position are evaluated by participants. Their findings show that given identical 
résumés, mothers were significantly less likely to be recommended for hire or promotion, 
offered marginally significantly lower starting salaries, and held to higher performance and 
punctuality standards (ibid.). Such biases influence the econometric analyses of women’s wage 
outcomes. 
Using population surveys from affluent countries and also conducting a survey experiment 
similar to that conducted by Benard and Correll (2010), Oesch et al. (2017) also find an 
unexplained wage penalty of 4% to 8% per child. This penalty is worse for younger mothers 
below the age of 40 and disappears for older mothers with older children or mothers in low 
income or low status jobs. This experiment corroborates the findings of Benard and Correll 
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(2010). Likewise, using data from the 1968-88 National Longitudinal Survey of Young 
Women, Anderson et al. (2003) observe that human capital inputs and unobserved 
heterogeneity explain 55-57% of the gap between mothers and women without children. 
Statistical discrimination starts from the idea that employers think membership in a given group 
sends a signal about the individual’s productivity (Cahuc, et al., 2014, p. 488). Statistical 
discrimination takes the form of stereotyping based on group membership that results from 
imperfect information (ibid.). For example due to this type of discrimination, women who 
intend to have children may start to believe that their return to education is lower than for the 
other group. This belief can incentivise these workers not to acquire education or a certain skills 
level. This affects the type of occupations and industries women enter. Thus a self-fulfilling 
prophecy may arise since employers anticipating women with children to be less skilled 
discourages women’s effort to be more efficient workers (Cahuc, et al., 2014, p. 493). 
Existing literature on the motherhood penalty in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is still scarce. In 
an overview of the South African labour market since 2008, amongst the youth aged 15 to 34 
years, unemployment continues to have a strong gender dimension. As a result, unemployment 
rates amongst Africans and women remain above the national mean (Development Policy 
Research Unit, 2012). The statistics are even worse for mothers in this age group, majority of 
whom are entitled to paid maternity leave (ibid.). 
Ntuli and Wittenberg (2013) use survey data to analyse African women’s participation in the 
labour force over the period of 1995 to 2004. The authors mention married women might have 
less economic need compared to single women. Furthermore, fertility increases wife’s value of 
time at home, negatively affecting prospects of labour market participation. Their results 
indicate non-labour income, marriage, fertility and geographical variation in economic 
development persistently stifled participation over the ten-year period. The probit regression 
results prove Black women aged between 35 and 44 years are the most likely to participate in 
the labour force. These could be women whose children are older and more independent. Even 
and Macpherson’s (1993) decomposition results for non-linear models reveal that marriage 
significantly reduces probability of a woman to participate in the South African labour market 
over the period, whilst divorce raises chances of participation. 
According to Baker’s (2010) qualitative study, domestic arrangements, perceptions of support, 
occupational requirements and ideas about “good mothering” affect women’s wage outcomes 
and vary according to context. For instance, due to high migrant labour rates in South Africa, 
one cannot immediately assume that mothers live with their children. Women with fewer or 
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older children are likely to migrate to more economically thriving regions, which has 
implications for wage outcomes. Posel and van der Stoep (2008) use a probit model and 
discover that females who are not co-resident mothers are significantly more likely to be labour 
force participants. Moreover, Posel and van der Stoep (2008) find that more than 45% of 
mothers, and almost 70% of non-mothers, are residents in households with children who are 
not their own. Even amongst these non-mothers, living with children lowers positive labour 
market outcomes. 
This fine distinction between mothers and co-residents of children makes for interesting 
analysis of motherhood penalty in the South African the labour market. This particular study 
on the child penalty is the first study in South Africa focusing specifically on wage differentials 
amongst women by parenthood status. Moreover, the use of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a 
nationally representative household survey with earnings data, provides a more detailed 
explanation of women’s wage outcomes. The conceptual framework used for analysis in this 
particular study is based on methodology applied by studies reviewed in this section. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data and Variables 
The data for this study comes from the nationally representative Labour Force Survey (LFS)2 
carried out by Statistics South Africa, which is publicly available. In the 2001 LFS, about 26, 
558 households and 106,000 individuals were interviewed, while in the 2005 and 2007 LFSs 
around 28,000 households (109,000 and 106,000 individuals respectively) were interviewed. 
The 2007 LFS is the latest nationally representative household survey with earnings data. This 
study focuses particularly on Black employed women aged between 20 and 50 years. 
According to Budlender et al. (2001), the 20–39 age group has the highest proportion of both 
men and women with children under the age of seven years. Nonetheless, very few labour 
market surveys have birth history information, let alone link mothers to their children. Dorrit 
Posel (2011) corroborates these details from her observation that studies on female labour force 
participation in South Africa have not been able to match women to their children. Even the 
datasets deemed most nationally representative household surveys in South Africa do not 
contain detailed birth history information. 
In a sample of Black women aged 20-49 from the 2002 General Household Survey (GHS) of 
South Africa with approximately 30, 000 households, about 15% of Black3 mothers are not 
co- resident with their own children, mostly due to labour migration (Posel & van der Stoep, 
2008). This implies that the effects of motherhood in the South African context are not 
carried by biological mothers alone. Consequently, the mother variable in this study is 
generated based on Baker’s (2010) findings that work/family integration is more complex for 
mothers: mothers do not always live with their children and childless women are not 
necessarily child-free. Therefore, in the analysis of this study, the mother or caregiver is a 
woman who co-resides with at least one child under the age of 15 in the same household. The 
study considers two sets of women: (1) mothers/caregivers (women with children in their 
households) and (2) non- mothers/non-caregivers or child-free4 women. 
In our sample of Black women aged 20-49, there are 13, 888 mothers and 3. 983 non-mothers 
in 2001, 14, 715 mothers and 4, 307 non-mothers in 2005, and 14, 829 mothers and 4, 490 
non-mothers in 2007. 
                                                      
2 Wage data are not collected in the more recent Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS), so the LFS is used instead as it 
contains the most recent real earnings observations. 
3 Black and African used synonymously in the paper. 
4Feminist labour economists have lately put forward that childless women be more appropriately referred to as child-free instead. 
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3.2 Model specification 
A number of studies in this area used fixed effects regressions. In the labour force survey, 
however, no attempt has been made to link individuals or households across waves, so there 
exists no a panel element for fixed regression analysis. Consequently, ordinary least squares 
models are applied for the three years. All three ordinary least squares (OLS) models in this 
study follow first from Mincer’s (1974) human capital wage equation in which individuals' 
log hourly wages are a function of their demographic characteristics, work experience, 
household characteristics, and educational attainment. To determine whether there exists a 
wage penalty for having additional children in the two sectors, a dummy variable for 
motherhood is included in these Mincerian equations, similar to the methodology employed in 
Casal and Barham (2013). The specifications are semi- logarithmic linear and additive models 
inspired by Budig and England (2001) and Wadfogel (1998). The dependent variable, lnwi, is 
the natural logarithm of the real hourly wages of women. Motherhood is the main independent 
variable. The indicator variable married and an interaction term (Mother*married) are 
incorporated to model the potential wage gains or losses of marriage. The work experience 
variable is age minus years of education minus early childhood (6 years). The work experience 
variable may overestimate actual work experience if women take any time off work to bear 
and raise children (Anderson, et al., 2003). 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
2 +
 𝛾5𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (1) 
The 2nd specification is inspired by Piras and Ripani (2005) who study of the effects of 
motherhood on wages in the developing countries of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, taking 
into account children’s age. Here children are grouped into two categories – children aged 
under 7 and those aged 7 to 15 years: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
2 +
 𝛾5𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾6𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟7𝑦𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟15𝑦𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾8𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
 𝜀𝑖   (2) 
 
The 3rd specification is motivated by analysis done by Aguero et al. (2012) where they posit 
that the penalty on wages increases as the number of children grows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
2 +
 𝛾5𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾8𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (3) 
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All three model results for the years 2001, 2005 and 2007 will be presented in the empirical 
results section. 
 
3.3 Going beyond the mean – RIF and reweighting 
The relationship between wages and motherhood status may vary by income level. 
Consequently, the study runs unconditional quantile (RIF-OLS) regressions to understand the 
effect of motherhood along the wage distribution. The recentered influence function (RIF) 
estimates the impact of changing the distribution of explanatory variables, on the marginal 
quantiles of the outcome variable, log of hourly wages, lnWi (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 
2007). The influence function (IF) for the τth unconditional quantile of the distribution of W, 
W (qτ), is expressed as: 
𝑰𝑭(𝑾; 𝒒𝝉) =  
𝝉−𝑰(𝑾≤𝒒𝝉)
𝒇𝒘(𝒒𝝉)
      (4)  
where fW and I(.) represent the marginal marginal density function of the wage distribution and an 
indicator function, respectively. The RIF and τth quantile is 
𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑊; 𝑞𝜏) =  𝑞𝜏 + 𝐼𝐹(𝑊; 𝑞𝜏)      (5) 
The τth quantile RIF regression aggregates to unconditional quantile of interest and allows 
one to decompose the gap into endowment and unexplained effects related to the explanatory 
variables (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 2007). The procedure provides a clear presentation of 
exactly where along the distribution the motherhood penalty has its greatest impact. 
 
3.3 Oaxaca Blinder decomposition 
Furthermore, this study uses a relatively more rigorous approach to the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition by combining it with the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression in 
order to decompose the log wages of working mothers and non-mothers by earning quantiles, 
rather than merely at the mean. Within the labour economics literature, discrimination is 
usually defined as the presence of different wage rates for workers with the same productivity 
or ability but with different personal characteristics (motherhood status in this case). The 
Oaxaca-Blinder procedure provides a way of 1) decomposing changes or differences in wages 
into a wage structure (unexplained) effect and a composition (explained) effect, and 2) further 
dividing these two components into the contribution of each covariate (Kwenda & Ntuli, 2015): 
𝑙𝑛?̅?𝑛𝑚 − 𝑙𝑛?̅?𝑚 = (?̅?𝑛𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)?̂?𝑛𝑚 + (?̂?𝑛𝑚 − ?̂?𝑚)?̅?𝑚 (6) 
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The procedure divides the wage differential between mothers and non-mothers into one part 
that is explained, and a residual part that is usually seen as a measure of discrimination, but 
also includes effects of group differences in unobserved predictors (Jann, 2008). The study 
applies the technique based on Firpo et al.’s (2009) recentered influence function (RIF) 
regressions. This methodology divides the motherhood wage differential at each unconditional 
quantile into a ‘composition effect’ (attributable to differences in observable characteristics) 
and a ‘price effect’ (attributable to unobservable differences). The method determines the 
partial contribution of each covariate to these components as well.  Moreover, the 
decomposition using RIF-regressions helps in understanding which variables are most 
important in understanding the wages of women and how much the wage differential between 
mothers and non-mothers remains unexplained at various points of the wage distribution. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The South African labour market experienced a 3.1 million increase in number of employed 
women from 1995 to 2007, albeit rising unemployment rates (van Klaveren, et al., 2009). 
Between 2000 and 2007, female employment grew by 7.6% (ibid.). In addition, some legal 
progress has been made in the South African labour market to protect the rights of pregnant 
women (ibid.). In the case of women who are employed, 54.56%, 54.15% and 55.19% in 2001, 
2005, and 2007 respectively, are mothers of at least one child aged under 7. More precisely, 
30.8% of mothers in 2001 (32.65% in 2005 and 34.13% in 2007) have one child, 16.11% in 
2001 have two children (15.92% in 2005 and 15.66% in 2007) and 7.64% had three or more 
children under age 7 in 2001 (5.58% in 2005 and 5.38% in 2007) (PALMS, 2017). In terms of 
older children, approximately 50.82%, 50.36% and 50.32% in 2001, 2005, and 2007 
respectively, are mothers of at least one child aged under 15. Out of these mothers 27.13% had 
one child  in  2001 (28.43% in  2005 and 30.99% in 2007), 15.79% had two  children  in 2001 
(14.63% in 2005 and 13.21% in 2007), and 7.91% had three or more children in 2001 (7.28% 
in 2005 and 6.12% in 2007) (ibid.). Clearly, the majority of employed women in South Africa 
reside with children. 
With these background statistics in mind, this section presents a descriptive profiling of 
participation, employment and wages of mothers versus non-mothers over the 2001-2007 time 
period. In order to understand key and relevant trends, the descriptive statistics focus primarily 
on the key explanatory variables used in the regression estimates. Table 1 below outlines the 
trend in the labour market outcomes of women. 
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Table 1: Labour Market Status of Women in South Africa – 1994 to 2007 
 
Employment status of mothers versus non-mothers - 1994 to 2007 
 Mothers/Caregivers Non-mothers/Non-Caregivers 
Year NEA Employed Unemployed Total NEA Employed Unemployed Total 
1994 6,596.08 3,590.52 1,820.85 12,007.45 1,007.05 708.33 275.22 1,990.59 
Percent 54.93 29.9 15.16  50.59 35.58 13.83  
1995 7,138.91 3,820.02 1,597.34 12,556.27 992.85 773.73 233.87 2,000.46 
Percent 56.86 30.42 12.72  49.97 38.51 11.53  
1996 7,715.88 3,215.05 1,745.46 12,676.39 1,465.4 946.65 347.04 2,759.09 
Percent 60.87 25.36 13.77  53.11 34.31 12.58  
1997 7,796.62 3,350.95 1,949.99 13,097.55 1,440.08 1,029.05 417.08 2,886.21 
Percent 59.53 25.58 14.89  49.9 35.65 14.45  
1998 7,189.93 3,559.08 2,488.79 13,237.8 1,397.261 1,291.83 571.37 3,260.45 
Percent 54.31 26.89 18.8  42.85 39.62 17.52  
1999 6,760.78 4,042.35 2,537.54 13,340.67 1,261.71 1,646.44 656.28 3,564.43 
Percent 50.68 30.3 19.02  35.4 46.19 18.41  
2000 5,362.72 5,108.68 3,169.09 13,640.49 1,040.42 1,949.46 842.57 3,832.45 
Percent 39.31 37.45 23.23  27.15 50.87 21.99  
2001 6,011.01 4,343.46 3,533.27 13,887.74 1,118.49 1,969.59 895.21 3,983.28 
Percent 43.28 31.28 25.44  28.08 49.45 22.47  
2002 6,034.34 4,300.579 3,861.54 14,196.45 1,128.05 2,076.21 935.19 4,139.46 
Percent 42.51 30.29 27.2  27.25 50.16 22.59  
2003 6,647.83 4,284.12 3,354.44 14,286.38 1,237.44 2,203.89 924.06 4,365.39 
Percent 46.53 29.99 23.48  28.35 50.49 21.17  
2004 7,059.24 4,463.29 3,078.68 14,601.22 1,389.04 2,114.9 747.14 4,251.08 
Percent 48.35 30.57 21.09  32.68 49.75 17.58  
2005 6,320.79 4,849.88 3,544.16 14,714.84 1,193.45 2,227.79 885.68 4,306.93 
Percent 42.96 32.96 24.09  27.71 51.73 20.56  
2006 6,181.59 4,980.74 3,664.71 14,827.05 1,208.95 2,338.79 826.15 4,373.9 
Percent 41.69 33.59 24.72  27.64 53.47 18.89  
2007 6,429.49 5,463.63 2,936.17 14,829.29 1,323.21 2,334.33 832.23 4,489.77 
Percent 43.36 36.84 19.8  29.47 51.99 18.54  
Source: 1994-1999 observations are from the October Household Survey (OHS); 2000-2007 numbers are 
from the September round of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
Notes: Results are for Black women between the ages of 20 and 50. The Data is weighted using 2001 Cross 
entropy weights. 
 
As the tabulated numbers indicate, most females in the labour market between the ages of 20 
and 50 are mothers, or at least co-residents with children. In terms of labour market status, 
mothers dominate the Not Economically Active (NEA) category. More mothers or caretakers 
than child-free women are unemployed. It is understood that employed women dominate the 
informal sector5 trade which offers flexibility in working hours (Department of Labour, 
2007). From the tabulated results, non-mothers also have higher employment rates than 
                                                      
It is difficult to compare survey estimates of the size of informal sector employment over time due to the evolution of the questions that 
attempt to capture informal sector employment.  
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mothers. The fact that most mothers are unemployed or not economically active is an important 
issue which requires attention. Nevertheless, for the sake of assessing the motherhood wage 
penalty, the rest of the study focuses on employed females in particular. 
Table 2 below investigates educational of outcomes of employed mothers and non-mothers.  
Table 2: Educational attainment of Black South African Women: 1994-2007 
 
Education Status of employed mothers and non-mothers. 



























1994 6,394.79 3,512.95 1,548.88 418.01 80.95 11,955.59 947.56 611.48 313.33 80.55 30.11 1,983.04 
Percent 53.49 29.38 12.96 3.5 0.68  47.78 30.84 15.8 4.06 1.52  
1995 6,303.43 3,521.68 1,872.17 593.56 132.46 12,423.3 955.11 582.78 338.56 119.59 35.43 2,031.47 
Percent 50.74 28.35 15.07 4.78 1.07  47.02 28.69 16.67 5.89 1.74  
1996 6,453.07 3,517.19 2,029.77 407.97 115 12,523.01 1,336.58 757.97 472.74 113.27 39.42 2,719.97 
Percent 51.53 28.09 16.21 3.26 0.92  49.14 27.87 17.38 4.16 1.45  
1997 6,384.03 4,076.10 2,072.08 447.21 100.51 13,079.94 1,304.95 846.85 577.76 115.61 35.02 2,880.18 
Percent 48.81 31.16 15.84 3.42 0.77  45.31 29.4 20.06 4.01 1.22  
1998 6,556.85 3,918.73 2,077.97 528.89 127.35 13,209.79 1,545.66 981.06 543.18 144.19 41.39 3,255.48 
Percent 49.64 29.67 15.73 4 0.96  47.48 30.14 16.68 4.43 1.27  
1999 6,311.08 3,904.71 2,262.61 506.89 208.23 13,193.53 1,627.12 956.71 707.23 164.36 68.61 3,524.04 
Percent 47.83 29.6 17.15 3.84 1.58  46.17 27.15 20.07 4.66 1.95  
2000 6,206.36 4,156.38 2,406.89 612.01 201.47 13,583.11 1,674.403 1,062.853 770.25 194.95 109.94 3,812.39 
Percent 45.69 30.6 17.72 4.51 1.48  43.92 27.88 20.2 5.11 2.88  
2001 6,045.64 4,292.71 2,551.01 634.68 284.26 13,808.3 1,733.59 1,115.794 810.85 215.19 85.51 3,960.95 
Percent 43.78 31.09 18.47 4.6 2.06  43.77 28.17 20.47 5.43 2.16  
2002 5,986.56 4,475.78 2,760.59 628.73 283.02 14,134.68 1,740.81 1,144.05 848.64 294.19 90.53 4,118.22 
Percent 42.35 31.67 19.53 4.45 2  42.27 27.78 20.61 7.14 2.2  
2003 5,598.39 4,634.17 3,054.82 687.89 250.26 14,225.53 1,668.01 1,243.76 1,089.26 260.94 92.92 4,354.89 
Percent 39.35 32.58 21.47 4.84 1.76  38.3 28.56 25.01 5.99 2.13  
2004 5,498.87 5,044.81 3,133.77 639.652 227.07 14,544.18 1,490.24 1,335.13 1,047.19 238.55 113.64 4,224.77 
Percent 37.81 34.69 21.55 4.4 1.56  35.27 31.6 24.79 5.65 2.69  
2005 5,215.15 5,106.94 3,372.0352 708.81 273.64 14,676.57 1,457.228 1,414.614 1,085.65 240.47 97.61 4,295.57 
Percent 35.53 34.8 22.98 4.83 1.86  33.92 32.93 25.27 5.6 2.27  
2006 4,877.56 5,390.78 3,538.23 731.49 239.51 14,777.56 1,379.175 1,454.73 1,143.06 293.37 84.39 4,354.72 
Percent 33.01 36.48 23.94 4.95 1.62  31.67 33.41 26.25 6.74 1.94  
2007 4,769.68 5,353.02 3,537.54 820.75 304.41 14,785.4 1,302.89 1,419.19 1,255.82 380.64 115.49 4,474.03 
Percent 32.26 36.2 23.93 5.55 2.06  29.12 31.72 28.07 8.51 2.58  
Source: 1994-1999 values observations from October Household Survey (OHS); 2000-2007 is September round 
of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
Notes: Results are for Black women between the ages of 20 and 50. Cross entropy Weights have been applied. 
Education is measured as highest level of education completed. These years of education are 
recoded into categories in the table above. Over the years, a greater proportion of non-
mothers have a matric or higher educational qualification. With that being said, mothers have 
been gaining more ground over the years in acquiring higher educational attainment levels. 
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Focusing on the most recent year (2007), 39.6% of child-free women have matric or higher 
qualification, versus 31.5% of mothers/caregivers. 
It is useful to look at more labour market trends of women and observe whether there are any 
significant differences in the observable traits. Table 3 below shows the means, standard 
deviations and t-test differences between the estimated means of the labour market variables 
of employed mothers and non-mothers. 
Table 3: Labour Market Characteristics of Employed Women – 2001, 2005, and 2007 
 
Descriptive statistics of by Parenthood Status 
 2001 2005 2007 

























Age 32.19* 0.071 33.29* 0.137 32.32* 0.071 32.93* 0.143 32.55 0.072 32.32 0.143 
Years of education 8.35 0.032 8.49 0.059 8.94* 0.029 9.14* 0.057 9.225* 0.029 9.513* 0.057 
Weekly hours 43.08* 0.283 46.73* 0.386 44.86* 0.293 47.12* 0.383 41.61* 0.237 43.278* 0.316 
Experience 17.8* 0.088 18.76* 0.169 17.371 0.086 17.78 0.173 17.31 0.086 16.83 0.173 
Hourly wages 25.38* 0.73 19.57* 0.736 44.05 14.803 21.88 0.745 31.77 0.809 27.82 1.296 
Married 0.43* 0.004 0.402* 0.008 0.407 0.004 0.41 0.008 0.409* 0.004 0.363* 0.008 
Source: 2001, 2005, and 2007 September rounds of the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Notes: Cross entropy Weights have been applied. The Hours variable includes part-time and full-time workers. 
The asterisk (*) denotes a significant difference between mean estimates for mothers and non-mothers at the 5% 
level. Data is weighted. Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 for comparability. 
The results in Table 3 above suggest that, on average, more mothers compared to non-mothers 
are married. Although child-free women have higher educational attainment levels than 
mothers, mothers seem to have higher mean wages than non-mothers. The tabulated results 
above imply that mothers work fewer hours per week than non-mothers. In terms of work 
experience, some mothers/caregivers may have taken breaks in between their career for 
maternity leave which may affect their total years of experience. This may potentially bias the 
mean results. 
According to the Time Use Survey, on average women did eight times as much care work as 
men (32 minutes and 4 minutes, respectively) per day. On average, employed women also spent 
more than five times as much time as men in care work (44 minutes per day compared to 5) at 
home (Budlender, et al., 2001). Thus employed women spend far more time than men working 
(paid plus unpaid labour), but less of their time doing paid work. Correspondingly, working 
women in the South African labour market are over-represented in part-time employment, 
which has been an important feature of the feminisation of the labour force (Posel & Muller, 
2007). The statistics above are important when thinking about the hours mothers and non- 
mothers spend at the workplace. 
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Overall, most women work in the private sector. Women with children may have anticipated 
that they want to have kids and therefore self-selected into more flexible occupations in the 
past. Many studies mention how women dominate in occupations such as clerks and 
domestic workers (Bhorat & Goga, 2013) in South Africa. Table 4 below paints a clearer 
picture of the occupations that women tend to opt into, by motherhood status. The table also 
provides information on the provinces in which women reside. According to the sample, 
mothers dominate elementary workers, professional workers and service and sales over the 
three years. Non-mothers dominate domestic work and clerks more than the mothers. 
Interestingly, more mothers than non-mothers are self-employed. This could be due to the 
fact that self- employment offers more flexibility in terms of work hours and other workplace 
conditions. When analysing the mean wages of the self-employed versus wage-employed 
women in the sample, it is self-employed women who have higher average earnings 
(PALMS, 2017). This detail in the data could provide interesting outcomes. 
Most employed Black women are based in Gauteng, a city full of migrant workers, of whom 
non-mothers dominate over mothers. The Eastern Cape, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal, North- 
West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo contain more working mothers than non-mothers compared 
to the remaining provinces (Western Cape and the Northern Cape). 
The distribution of women in various provinces speaks to the occupational types which prevail 
in each province. Some women are willing to migrate to certain regions in order to participate 
in these industries. Table 5 below examines further the skills levels of women in each province 
for the year 2007. Most mothers in skilled occupations such as doctors and engineers are based 
in Gauteng. Most mothers in medium-skilled occupations such as clerks, teachers and nurses 
are based in KwaZulu-Natal. Most women with children in low-skilled occupations such as 
domestic work and agriculture are based in the Northern Cape. Most high-skilled non-mothers 
are based in Limpopo; most medium-skilled women are based in the Free State. Most low- 
skilled women are based in Mpumalanga. 
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Table 4: Occupational & Geographical Status of Mothers & Non-mothers: 2001, 2005 & 2007 
 
 2001 2005 2007 
 
Mother Non-mother Mother Non-mother Mother Non-mother 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Private 3,723.37 79.92 1,785.84 85.86 3,826.89 81.84 1,738.94 86.3 3,777.5 81.1 1,614.18 81.24 
Public 935.63 20.08 294.16 14.14 849.1 18.16 276.06 13.7 880.49 18.9 372.82 18.76 
Self-employed 1,173.59 25.72 242.52 11.76 1,364.85 29.59 262.09 13.1 1,044.03 22.55 206.96 10.42 
Wage-employed 3,389.41 74.28 1,820.48 88.24 3,248.15 70.41 1,738.91 86.9 3,584.97 77.45 1,780.04 89.58 
High-skilled             
Managers 54.69 1.18 22.12 1.07 122.96 2.63 44.27 2.19 166.51 3.55 69.82 3.5 
Professional 727.97 15.75 221.52 10.68 686.6 14.67 209.58 10.39 881.4 18.8 313.11 15.69 
Medium-Skilled             

































































































































































Western Cape 465.89 3.22 222.19 5.25 600.62 4.08 179.35 4.45 440.68 3.08 225.32 5.73 
Eastern Cape 2,130.97 14.72 433.37 10.25 2,102.71 14.28 426.62 10.59 1,993.46 13.91 459.32 11.68 
Northern Cape 146.35 1.01 36.64 0.87 143.37 0.97 33.61 0.83 131.94 0.92 38.79 0.99 
Free State 919.81 6.35 314.23 7.43 965.76 6.56 243.18 6.04 965.92 6.74 256.11 6.51 
KwaZulu-Natal 3,282.77 22.67 908.22 21.48 3,181.06 21.6 879.24 21.83 3,110.21 21.7 782.76 19.9 
North West 1,349.69 9.32 373.53 8.83 1,383.04 9.39 325.73 8.09 1,366.65 9.54 324.19 8.24 
Gauteng 2,796.26 19.31 1,378.26 32.59 2,846.97 19.33 1,341.63 33.32 2,926.39 20.42 1,204.9 30.63 
Mpumalanga 1,212.25 8.37 241.19 5.7 1,276.52 8.67 265.11 6.58 1,198.53 8.36 267.84 6.81 
Limpopo 2,173.99 15.02 321.35 7.6 2,227.95 15.13 332.52 8.26 2,197.21 15.33 374.77 9.53 
Notes: Own calculations: LFS (2001, 2005 and 2007) 
Notes: Cross entropy Weights have been applied 
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Low-skilled 47.45 42.73 46.38 43.68 46.15 51.29 42.68 51.49 38.77 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2007 
Notes: Cross entropy Weights have been applied 
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Figures 1 (a), (b) and (c): Weekly Hours6 Worked by Women – 2001, 2005, and 2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using September rounds of LFS 2001, 2005, and 2007 
Notes: Coding adapted from (Wittenberg, 2012) Stata practical notes. Earnings data have been deflated to 
September 2016 for comparability. The data are weighted using Cross entropy Weights. 
 
                                                      
The weekly hours variable refers to hours worked in the past 7 days in the main job and in other activities. Respondents who reported 
working more than 112 hours a week, or 16 hours per day have been excluded. 
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The kernel densities in Figure 1 above inspect the difference in the number of workplace hours 
worked by women over the three years. As confirmed by the graphs above, in 2001 and 2007, 
the distribution of hours for non-mothers is shifted more to the right than for mothers, meaning 
that women without children consistently work longer hours than mothers/caregivers. In 2005, 
more non-mothers work 45 or more hours per week compared to mothers. Along the 
distribution in 2005, it is clear that at longer hours (80 or more hours per week), mothers 
dominate. This could be the case in highly demanding occupations. Additionally, mothers who 
can afford child-care are more likely to work longer hours, especially where their children are 
older. There may also be a sibling effect7 at play, where the older siblings take care of the 
younger ones, allowing the parent to work required hours. 
Before modelling the wage returns of mothers/caregivers and childfree women, it is useful to 
evaluate the difference in earnings levels between the two groups over the years. The figures 
presented below illustrate the difference in real earnings of women at various points along the 
wage distribution. A distinction has been made between the hourly wages of full-time working 
women versus those who work part-time (less than 35 hours per week). 
Figure 2: Hourly wages8 for Full-time and Part-time female workers, 2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2007 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 for comparability. The Data is weighted using Cross 
entropy Weights. 
                                                      
7 The sibling effect is the case where older siblings take care of younger siblings whilst parents are not home. 
8 Study uses the 2001 LFS rather than the 2000 LFS in light of the fact that the 2000 wage data seems to be an outlier in the series: Burger 
and Yu (2006) found that average earnings were dramatically higher in the September 2000 LFS than in the surveys directly preceding and 
following it (Burger & Yu, 2006). 
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Figure 3: Hourly Wages for Full-time and Part-time Female Workers, 2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2007 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 for comparability. The Data is weighted using Cross 
entropy Weights. 
 
The graphical results in Figures 2 and 3 above imply the following: the fully employed, non- 
mothers earn more than mothers at the 10th and 25th quantiles in 2007. For part-time employees, 
non-mothers earn more hourly wages than mothers at the 10th, 25th and 50th (mean) quantiles. 
Using fixed effects on the LFS 2001-2004, Posel and Muller (2007) find evidence of a 
significant wage premium to female part-time employment. The authors allude to presence of 
a wage floor existing below which wages for part-time workers are not allowed to fall as an 
explanation. The fact that mothers are more likely to work part-time compared to non-
mothers could explain to an extent these illustrated wage outcomes. The 2001 and 2005 bar 
graphs display a similar conclusion and these graphs are in the appendix section. 
 
Tabulations of the mean hourly wages by province for employed mothers and non-mothers are 
presented in the Appendix Section. The 2001 numbers reveal that in the Western Cape, the 
North West and Mpumalanga, non-mothers earn more than mothers. In 2007, non-mothers in 
the Western Cape and the Free State earn more than mothers. For 2007, non-mothers in the 
Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and Mpumalanga reported higher earnings than mothers. 
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Figures 4 (a), (b) and (c): Kernel Density Estimates of Wage9 Distributions for Mother and 
Non-mothers – 2001, 2005 and 2007 
 
Own calculations using LFS 2001, 2005 and 2007 
Notes: Coding adapted from (Wittenberg, 2012) Stata practical notes. Earnings data have been deflated to 
September 2016 for comparability. Data weighted using 2001 cross-entropy Census weights.
                                                      
The detailed information from LFS on individual earnings and hours worked per week in the primary job is used to construct gross hourly 
wages deflated to September 2016 values using the consumer price index for comparability between years. 
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The discussion thus far proves that the wage difference between mothers and non-mothers 
varies according to where along the wage distribution one observes. Scrutinizing the kernel 
densities in figure 4 above verifies that at the lower quantiles, the log wages for non-mothers 
are shifted more to the right than mothers. At higher quantiles the opposite relationship 
prevails. 
The figure below illustrates the wage gap or wage differential between mothers and non- 
mothers at various quantiles along the wage distribution. The curves represent the log hourly 
wage of mothers minus the log hourly wages of non-mothers for the three years (2001, 2005, 
and 2007). 
Figure 5: Difference in Log Hourly Wages of Mothers versus Non-mothers by Quantile – 
2001, 2005, & 2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using LFS 2001 
Notes: Coding retrieved from Stata journal by (Cox, 2004). Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 
for comparability. Data is weighted using 2001 Census (cross-entropy) weights. The separate graphs for the three 
years are included the appendix section. 
 
In 2001, mothers earn less than non-mothers up until the 20th quantile. In 2005 and 2007, 
mothers earn less than non-mothers until around the 30th and 40th quantiles, respectively. 
Around the mean, as corroborated by previous graphs and tables, mothers earn more than non- 
mothers, especially in 2001. In 2001 and 2005, at higher quantiles, mothers earn significantly 
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more than non-mothers. Contrastingly, the 2007 dataset shows that the wage gap between 
mothers and non-mothers narrows around the 80th and 90th percentiles. 
 
 
5. Estimating the Motherhood/Child Wage Gap 
Under Mincer’s human capital framework, various factors affect earnings. Pre-market factors 
such as education are useful to consider in the analysis of wage differentials. The wage 
estimations contain experience variables instead of age dummies. As can be seen from Table 6 
below, ceteris paribus, women in the sample exhibit positive wage returns to education. 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) indicate that the marital status of an individual can 
be interpreted as a productivity indicator. The results above indicate that marriage is related to 
negative wage outcomes for mothers, although not statistically significant. Mothers who are 
also married suffer a wage penalty in 2001 and 2005, but not in 2007.The OLS results also 
confirm the assumption that the negative impact of children seems to diminish as children 
grow: women with younger children (aged 7 or younger) suffer a larger wage penalty than 
those with older children. Women with two or more children carry a heavier wage penalty than 
those with one child only. Domestic workers, majority of whom are child-free, earn the least 
compared to other occupations. These effects are consistent over the three years. In terms of 
experience, wages increase positively with experience (at an increasing rate at lower quantiles 
and at a decreasing rate at higher quantiles). Focusing on the mother indicator variable in the 
first specification for the three years, on average, mothers earned 13.5% less than non-mothers 
in 2001, 8.87% less than non-mothers in 2005, and 5.5% less than non-mothers in 2007. So on 
average, there does exist a motherhood penalty. 
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results – 2001, 2005, & 2007 
 
VARIABLES  2001   2005   2007  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Years of Educ. 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 
 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
Married -0.0223 0.156*** 0.165*** -0.0237 0.107*** 0.116*** -0.0119 0.136*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0658) -0.029 (0.0285) (0.0512) (0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0498) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
Experience 0.00024 0.0151** 0.0162** 0.0187** 0.0273*** 0.0279*** 0.0275*** 0.0355*** 0.0363*** 
 -0.0099 -0.007 (0.00711) -0.007 (0.00512) (0.00510) (0.00679) (0.00445) (0.00445) 
Experience Sq. 0.0005** 9.26e-05 7.36e-05 9.09e-05 -8.69e-05 -9.48e-05 -5.50e-05 -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00015 (9.72e-05) (9.73e-05) 
Mother -0.135**   -0.0887**   -0.0550   
 (0.0576)   (0.0410)   (0.0364)   























  (0.0172)   (0.0127)   (0.0101)  
One child   -0.113**   -0.106***   -0.0981*** 
 
Two or more 
children 







   (0.0300)   (0.0257)   (0.0209) 




(0.231) (0.112) (0.113) (0.203) (0.119) (0.119) (0.154) (0.1000) (0.0994) 
0.089 -0.0498 -0.0432 0.0395 -0.0301 -0.0181 -0.222 -0.291*** -0.295*** 
Professionals (0.229) (0.106) (0.106) (0.196) (0.107) (0.107) (0.137) (0.0795) (0.0798) 
Clerks -0.489** -0.515*** -0.506*** -0.438** -0.386*** -0.373*** -0.545*** -0.668*** -0.666*** 
 (0.231) (0.108) (0.109) (0.195) (0.108) (0.108) (0.132) (0.0851) (0.0844) 
Services & Sales -1.145*** -1.032*** -1.028*** -1.301*** -1.055*** -1.048*** -1.170*** -1.120*** -1.123*** 
 (0.229) (0.105) (0.106) (0.192) (0.105) (0.104) (0.129) (0.0874) (0.0879) 
Skilled Agric. -1.154*** -1.261*** -1.260*** -1.143*** -1.105*** -1.096*** -1.542*** -1.271*** -1.286*** 
& Fisheries (0.290) (0.115) (0.116) (0.265) (0.197) (0.196) (0.168) (0.106) (0.106) 




(0.232) (0.104) (0.105) (0.194) (0.102) (0.102) (0.133) (0.0753) (0.0754) 




(0.237) (0.105) (0.105) (0.199) (0.103) (0.103) (0.134) (0.0841) (0.0854) 
-1.243*** -1.230*** -1.227*** -1.357*** -1.213*** -1.206*** -1.294*** -1.285*** -1.293*** 
 (0.227) (0.104) (0.104) (0.189) (0.102) (0.102) (0.126) (0.0756) (0.0758) 
Domestic Work -1.490*** -1.605*** -1.599*** -1.316*** -1.422*** -1.412*** -1.347*** -1.467*** -1.470*** 
 (0.226) (0.104) (0.105) (0.186) (0.102) (0.102) (0.132) (0.0878) (0.0875) 
Constant 2.625*** 2.750*** 2.762*** 2.228*** 2.367*** 2.357*** 2.256*** 2.257*** 2.248*** 
 (0.197) (0.147) (0.146) (0.220) (0.133) (0.131) (0.259) (0.126) (0.126) 
Observations 5,071 11,184 11,184 5,032 10,954 10,954 5,117 11,481 11,481 
R-squared 0.448 0.393 0.394 0.463 0.399 0.399 0.498 0.444 0.443 
Source: Own calculations using September rounds of LFS 2001, 2005, and 2007. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (computed using bootstrapping procedure). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The dependent variable is log of real hourly wages. The base category for occupation categories is Managers. The ‘Other’ 
category is excluded from the estimation. The province results have been omitted from the table and are available on request. 
Data are weighted. 
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5.1 RIF-OLS regression results 
The tables below display the RIF10 estimates for women from the 10th to the 90th wage 
quantiles. The discussion focuses on 2007 results as they are comparable to those of 2001 and 
2005, as shown in Tables 2A and 3A in appendix. In 2001, child-free women experienced 
higher returns to education than mothers only at the 90th quantile. At all quantiles, women 
encounter positive wage returns to experience. Mothers experience higher returns to 
schooling overall. In terms of experience, mothers experience higher returns than non-
mothers, except at the 90th percentile. Married non-mothers experience lower wage returns 
than their unmarried counterparts at the 10th and 30th quantiles. This result is not significant 
for mothers. At the 70th and 90th quantiles, married mothers earn more than unmarried 
mothers. The results are similar for 2005 and 2007. For all three years, at the bottom of the 
wage distribution – at the 10th and 20th quantiles to be exact – non-mothers earn more than 
mothers, ceteris paribus. At the other quantiles, mothers earn more than non-mothers. 
Higher incomes in some professions, such as medicine, may provide strong incentives to 
remain employed after the birth of a child, whereas lower paid female-dominated professions 
may not offer similar incentives. Higher incomes may also offer greater financial resources to 
purchase high quality childcare. From the descriptive statistics section, it was established that 
a greater proportion of mothers over non-mothers is self-employed. Self-employed women 
generally earn more than wage workers. Perhaps this might partly support why at higher 
quantiles mothers have higher wage returns than non-mothers. Table 7 below presents women’s 
wage returns at different quantiles of the wage distribution. 
Observing the 2007 tabulated numbers below, interestingly, mothers at all quantiles except for 
the 90th quantile benefit more from a degree qualification than non-mothers. In terms of 
experience, wages increase positively with experience levels. At higher quantiles, married 
women (both mothers and non-mothers) consistently encounter a marriage premium. There are 
positive returns to work experience at all quantiles, except for non-mothers at the 70th quantile 
(this result is not statistically significant). Since the results for the three years relate similar 







                                                      
10 Unconditional Quantile regression gives heteroscedasticity robust standard errors (Melly, 2004). 
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Table 7: Recentered Influence Function (RIF) -Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results, 2007 
 











































 (0.0154) (0.0168) (0.00794) (0.00902) (0.00661) (0.00937) (0.00851) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0157) 
Professional 0.224 0.156 0.0614 0.337** 0.0528 0.479*** 0.443** 0.855*** 1.757*** 1.778** 























Professionals (0.196) (0.201) (0.0978) (0.139) (0.0981) (0.178) (0.190) (0.288) (0.468) (0.684) 
Clerks 0.314 0.0722 0.0822 0.186 0.0168 0.214 -0.00945 0.125 -1.192*** -1.221* 























 (0.209) (0.217) (0.101) (0.143) (0.0987) (0.181) (0.184) (0.284) (0.430) (0.617) 
Skilled Agric. -1.170** -0.276 -0.958*** -0.513** -0.827*** -0.676*** -1.075*** -1.204*** -1.850*** -1.995*** 
& Fisheries (0.468) (0.377) (0.189) (0.214) (0.157) (0.222) (0.235) (0.279) (0.431) (0.618) 
Craft & Trade 0.270 0.0474 -0.235** 0.104 -0.539*** -0.0550 -0.985*** -0.578* -2.019*** -2.099*** 





































































 (0.208) (0.212) (0.103) (0.143) (0.0975) (0.177) (0.180) (0.273) (0.425) (0.611) 
Married -0.0856 -0.0976 0.0311 -0.0132 0.0261 0.0424 0.0959** 0.0999 0.107 0.126 
 (0.0661) (0.0718) (0.0368) (0.0427) (0.0329) (0.0490) (0.0439) (0.0637) (0.0658) (0.0981) 
Experience 0.00229 0.0149 -0.00721 0.00693 0.00698 0.00364 0.00241 -0.00657 0.0515*** 0.0459** 























 (0.000365) (0.000373) (0.000196) (0.000207) (0.000168) (0.000226) (0.000215) (0.000277) (0.000249) (0.000383) 
Constant 0.907*** 1.090*** 1.956*** 1.845*** 2.580*** 2.138*** 2.626*** 2.721*** 3.364*** 3.415*** 























R-squared 0.066 0.074 0.160 0.168 0.257 0.256 0.308 0.336 0.347 0.373 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2007 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes all Africans between 20 
and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wages and hours of work data, and the data are weighted using 2001 Census 
weights. The dependent variable is log of real hourly wages. The standard errors are shown in brackets below the estimates. 
The base category for occupation is managers. The ‘Other’ category is excluded from the estimation. The province results 
have been omitted from the table and are available on request. 
 
The RIF-OLS results above confirm that the effect of motherhood may differ amongst lower 
and higher wage workers. Women in elite, male-dominated professions are likely qualitatively 
different than women in other professions in ways that cannot be measured (Buchmann & 
30  
Mcdaniel, 2016), which may affect the results. The unconditional or marginal quantile 
regression model (UQR) decomposition will help in testing whether penalties or rather wage 
inequalities differ by skill and wage level (observable traits). The results for 2001 and 2005 
reveal similar associations. 
5.2 Decomposition results 
RIF (unconditional quantile regression framework) decomposition regression analysis builds 
on the pre-existing discrimination literature which was focused on the mean, rather than 
specific percentiles of the wage distribution. If one assumes that childless women are 
compensated fairly and mothers are undercompensated, one would use the non-mothers’ 
coefficients as reference coefficients, and vice versa (Jann, 2008). Table 8 below displays the 
decomposition results for 2007, using the mother coefficients as the reference coefficients. 
 
Table 8: RIF Decomposition Results of the Motherhood Earnings Gap, 2007 
     
 Gap  Explained Unexplained 
10th quantile 0.136*** (0.0430) 0.0108 (0.0164) 0.126*** (0.0439) 
 100%  7.9%  92.1%  
20th quantile 0.0418 (0.0385) 0.00812 (0.0177) 0.0337 (0.0380) 
 100%  19.4%  80.6%  
30th quantile -0.113*** (0.0351) -0.00597 (0.0194) -0.107*** (0.0332) 
 100%  5.3%  94.7%  
40th quantile -0.117*** (0.0364) -0.0161 (0.0223) -0.101*** (0.0330) 
 100%  13.7%  86.3%  
50th quantile -0.157*** (0.0378) -0.0225 (0.0243) -0.135*** (0.0334) 
 100%  14.0%  86.0%  
60th quantile -0.138*** (0.0452) -0.0455 (0.0304) -0.0926** (0.0389) 
 100%  33.0%  67.1%  
70th quantile -0.153*** (0.0558) -0.0427 (0.0375) -0.110** (0.0473) 
 100%  27.9%  71.9%  
80th quantile -0.319*** (0.0639) -0.0627* (0.0371) -0.256*** (0.0563) 
 100%  19.7%  80.3%  
90th quantile -0.466*** (0.0689) -0.0867*** (0.0329) -0.379*** (0.0655) 
 100%  18.6%  81.3%  
Observations 6,635 6,635 6,635 6,635 6,635 6,635 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2007 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes all 
Africans between 20 and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wages and hours of work data, and 
the data are weighted. The dependent variable is log of real hourly wages. 
The motherhood pay gap is highest at the 90th quantile, with mothers earning more than non- 
mothers at this point. The motherhood pay gap is smallest at the 20th quantile, where non- 
mothers earn more than mothers. The unexplained proportion of the wage gap is higher than 
the explained proportion of the gap at all quantiles. This implies a greater proportion of the 
motherhood pay gap is explained by unobservable characteristics such as discrimination with 
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regard to earnings between the two groups than by differences in observable characteristics. At 
the mean for instance, unobserved traits account for 86% of the gap. In other words, the results 
suggest that productive characteristics account for less of the wage gap. This outcome actually 
corroborates findings in a similar study conducted by Anderson et al. (2003). 
In their comparable study amongst White women in the United States, Budig and Hodges 
(2014) discover that mechanisms contributing towards the penalty vary by earnings level. 
Consequently, they posited that family resources, work effort and compensating differentials10 
account for a greater portion of the penalty amongst low earners (ibid.). For high wage earners, 
personal and intrinsic factors might be contributing towards the direction and magnitude of the 
gap. Results for Black South African women are more nuanced compared to international 
studies. Most Black women lie at the lower end of the income distribution. Clearly there exists 
a penalty for motherhood, but when analysing the two groups separately (mothers versus non- 
mothers), the penalty seems less obvious or rather prominent only at lower income quantiles. 
 
Even for women in high-wage occupations, survey data analysis in the West by Buchmann and 
Daniel (2016) confirms that mothers are paid less than childless women, however the negative 
penalty is less in low-wage female dominated occupations. Where the motherhood/child 
penalty is stark and prominent in international studies, in the case of South Africa only women 
at lower income levels experience this negative phenomenon more noticeably. 
The decomposition results imply that most of the wage gap is due to unexplained 
characteristics. For instance, in her decomposition analysis of women’s labour force 
participation rates in South Africa, Ntuli (2007) finds that the differential in wages cannot be 
fully explained by differences between mothers and other women in work experience and job 
characteristics. Considering mothers’ high non-participation and unemployment rates, the 
findings exhibit that female participation responds positively to education which has been the 
prime factor for positive employment and wage outcomes. Amongst high-skilled (education) 
wage earners, motherhood might have a less pronounced effect on earnings differences. 
Furthermore, non-labour income, marriage, fertility and geographical variations may have an 





10 A compensating differential is the additional amount of income that a given worker must be offered in order 
to motivate them to accept a given undesirable job (Cahuc, et al., 2014). 
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6. Conclusion 
This study has investigated the motherhood wage differential amongst women in South Africa 
using 2001, 2005 and 2007 cross-sectional data from the Labour Force Survey. Evidence from 
this study confirms that the motherhood penalty does exist, especially at lower wage levels. 
After controlling for observable labour market characteristics, the results verify that the family 
penalty is largest when a woman’s children are young and declines with children’s age. The 
women most vulnerable to wage penalties for having child dependents are those at the lower 
end of the wage distribution. Contrary to international studies such as that of Budig and 
England (2014), in the case of South Africa, marriage has positive wage effects for mothers at 
higher wage quantiles. 
The RIF-OLS results confirm that at lower wage quantiles, mothers earn less than women who 
do not have children while at higher quantiles, the reverse is observed. This effect may indicate 
that high-skilled women with children might experience more favourable employment 
conditions. Alternative explanations to the direction of the wage gap at higher income levels 
may include the existence of a part-time work premium. In addition, self-employed women, 
majority of whom are mothers, earn more than non-mothers. These findings lead to the 
conclusion that less skilled women tend to suffer a heavy penalty for motherhood. This 
highlights the value of higher education for women. Some discrimination due to motherhood 
may still exist at higher wage levels; but as substantiated by the decomposition results, a better 
understanding of the unobservable traits is a requirement. 
The decomposition results confirm that a large component of the wage gap between mothers 
and non-mothers is unexplained by the model. By focusing on the experiences of working 
women alone, past studies and this study have ignored the selectivity into employment and 
have not considered how motherhood may influence employment decisions. Selection into 
certain occupations may affect the unexplained differences between the groups. For instance, 
Table 1 in the descriptive statistics section proves that most mothers either do not participate 
in the labour force or are unemployed. This is an important part of the discussion with regard 
to the child gap and it is clear that work needs to be done on this, even if it was not the focus 
of this study.  
Historically, most South African studies have dealt with the sample selection problem by 
using the Heckman procedure to account for selection effects. Here, the earnings function is 
modelled on the characteristics of earners conditional on the fact that these earners are a 
subsample of all the employed, which is in turn a subsample of potential participants (Bhorat 
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& Goga, 2013). More recently, in line with the international literature, more studies have cited 
the difficulty of applying appropriate exclusion restrictions. In addition, the selection 
procedure may result in a problem of measurement error since an estimate of the expected 
value of the error term is used in the second stage of the procedure. In previous South African 
studies where selection has been accounted for, the female selection bias correction terms 
were largely insignificant (Ntuli & Wittenberg, 2013). This study does not apply these 
correction measures, which presents the first limitation to the study.  
Secondly, The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition strategy assumes three identifying assumptions 
(Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 2014, p. 507): firstly, the set of explanatory variables 
influencing wage levels should be the same for both men and women. Second is the conditional 
mean assumption (distribution of unobservable characteristics independent of group 
membership conditional on observable characteristics). This assumption may not hold 
considering that group membership such as union membership may be endogenous based on 
unobservable traits. Another restriction is the assumption of the invariance of the conditional 
distributions, which excludes the possibility of equilibrium effects and self-selection into 
groups based on unobservable traits. Considering the sample being studied, this condition 
may not be satisfied. 
Thirdly, because the motherhood penalty calculations are based on wages only, it is difficult to 
debate differentials in bonuses and non-pecuniary work benefits amongst females. 
Unobservable factors such as the timing of child-bearing and even sibling effects may 
complicate modelling impact of motherhood on labour market outcomes. Moreover, some 
childfree women might have to take care of elderly parents or grandparents (England, et al., 
2016), which may affect their wages. The study cannot control for unobservables such as 
network effects either. It is also useful to take into account the difference in the characteristics 
of women who stay behind to take care of children versus those who migrate to other provinces 
for work. Some of these traits may not be represented by available survey data variables. For 
this reason they could not be controlled for in estimation, in spite of their relevance. 
Finally, the Labour Force Survey which has rich info on labour market on wage outcomes does not link 
biological mothers to their children due to lack of birth history information. The methodology section 
explains how this challenge is overcome to define motherhood status. Furthermore, to calculate a 
motherhood pay gap between mothers and non-mothers presupposes that motherhood does not 
affect the pay of non-mothers. This in turn suggests that pay discrimination is separate from 
and not linked to women’s roles as mothers, except when women are actively engaged in 
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motherhood (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2015). This is why behavioural studies are pertinent in 
understanding dynamics surrounding motherhood wage gap. For example, Kricheli-Katz 
(2012) conducts a hiring experiment in a laboratory in Israel to distinguish between 
discrimination-based and productivity-based explanations of the motherhood penalty. The 
author finds n sormative discrimination against mothers. Bedi et al. (2017) discover parallel 
results in India for a similar study. The penalty is worse in cultures of patrilineal11 origin in 
India. Societal norms therefore affect nature and extent of labour market discrimination 
against women in general. 
Labour market policy which accommodates women with children at lower wage levels could 
have positive results for labour market outcomes. More educational attainment opportunities 
for women are crucial for improved labour market outcomes for mothers and non-mothers 
alike. Considering the low participation and employment rates of mothers, it would be 
beneficial for future research to conduct behavioural studies to understand better this 
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 2001 2005 2007 

























Western Cape 16.43 13.93 27.18 42.5 16.2 15.2 17.8 11.3 25.16 28.87 23.42 23.65 






















































North West 22.67 30.5 25.14 55.3 33.4 51.5 26.86 36.54 33.73 44.89 25.9 29.27 
Gauteng 37.6 59.77 22.7 30.6 29.9 35.9 20.02 28.22 38.96 54.77 29.52 35.27 
Mpumalanga 17.39 23.16 17.6 22.4 24.1 31.9 23.48 34.03 20.65 25.45 27.08 35.01 
Limpopo 24.82 49.24 20.8 34.6 24.4 37.34 23.94 34.71 34.18 76.97 26.15 28.54 
Source: Own calculations using September rounds of LFS 2001, 2005 and 2007 
Notes: Cross entropy Weights have been applied 
 
 
Figure 1A: Histogram and Distribution of Hours Worked – 2001 
 
Source: Own calculations: LFS (2001, September) 
Notes: the sample includes all Africans between 20 and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wage and work hours 
data. The data are weighted using 2001 Census weights. 
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Figure 2A: Histogram and Distribution of Hours Worked – 2001 
 
 
Source: Own calculations: LFS (2005, September) 
Notes: the sample includes all Africans between 20 and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wage and work hours 
data. The data are weighted using 2001 Census weights. 
 
 
Figure 3A: Histogram and Distribution of Hours Worked – 2001 
 
 
Source: Own calculations: LFS (2007, September) 
Notes: the sample includes all Africans between 20 and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wage and work hours 
data. The data are weighted using 2001 Census weights. 
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Figures 4A (a), (b), (c) and (c): Hourly Wages for Full-time and Part-time Female Workers, 
2001 and 2005 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using LFS 2001 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 for comparability. The data are weighted. 
 
Source: Own calculations using LFS 2005 




Source: Own calculations using LFS 2001 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to November 2014 for comparability. The data are weighted. 
Source: Own calculations using LFS 2005 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to November 2014 for comparability. The data are weighted. 
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Figures 5A (a), (b) and (c): Motherhood Wage Differential by Quantiles – 2001, 2005 and 
2007 
 
Source: Own calculations using LFS 2001 
Notes: Coding retrieved from Stata journal by (Cox, 2004). Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 
for comparability. Data weighted using 2001 Census weights 
 
Own calculations using LFS 2005 
Notes: Coding retrieved from Stata journal by (Cox, 2004). Earnings data have been deflated to September 2016 
for comparability. Data weighted using 2001 Census weights 
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Own calculations using LFS 2007 
Notes: Earnings data have been deflated to November 2014 for comparability. Data weighted using 2001 Census 
weights. Coding retrieved from Stata journal by (Cox, 2004). 
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Table 2A: Recentred Influence Function (RIF) -Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results, 2001 
 





















Years of Educ. 0.0787*** 0.0592*** 0.127*** 0.0809*** 0.134*** 0.0961*** 0.114*** 0.0988*** 0.0666*** 0.0873*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.00920) (0.00986) (0.00870) (0.00990) (0.00900) (0.0111) (0.00964) (0.0160) 
Professional 0.0170 -0.354** -0.0178 -0.0555 -0.0195 0.193 0.353 0.239 2.642*** 3.891*** 























Professionals (0.140) (0.137) (0.149) (0.270) (0.153) (0.347) (0.260) (0.423) (0.576) (1.166) 
Clerks 0.0961 -0.373** 0.0662 -0.114 -0.194 0.0127 -0.691** -0.615 -1.460*** -1.089 























 (0.156) (0.152) (0.159) (0.275) (0.161) (0.351) (0.261) (0.427) (0.547) (1.127) 
Skilled Agric. -0.160 -0.161 -0.723** -0.750** -1.427*** -0.730 -1.789*** -2.028*** -1.844*** -2.563** 
& Fisheries (0.324) (0.247) (0.333) (0.380) (0.286) (0.452) (0.381) (0.464) (0.604) (1.118) 
Craft & Trade 0.0903 -0.183 -0.140 -0.0209 -0.824*** -0.145 -1.712*** -1.168** -2.099*** -2.435** 














































 (0.153) (0.149) (0.156) (0.274) (0.157) (0.350) (0.258) (0.423) (0.544) (1.117) 
Domestic Work -0.282* -0.612*** -0.713*** -0.631** -1.467*** -1.025*** -2.391*** -2.064*** -2.186*** -2.513** 
 (0.154) (0.146) (0.159) (0.272) (0.158) (0.347) (0.256) (0.418) (0.543) (1.113) 
Married -0.0413 -0.151*** 0.0184 -0.130** 0.124*** -0.0898 0.159*** 0.00134 0.119* 0.116 
 (0.0508) (0.0572) (0.0452) (0.0517) (0.0445) (0.0564) (0.0488) (0.0635) (0.0644) (0.0970) 
Experience 0.0166 0.0561*** 0.0258** 0.0326*** 0.0230** 0.0197* 0.0204* 0.0251** 0.0259** 0.0230 























 (0.000284) (0.000295) (0.000239) (0.000237) (0.000230) (0.000246) (0.000238) (0.000272) (0.000231) (0.000389) 
Constant 0.399 0.706*** 0.866*** 1.368*** 1.972*** 2.140*** 3.255*** 3.431*** 4.436*** 4.231*** 























R-squared 0.088 0.121 0.227 0.218 0.324 0.318 0.413 0.372 0.352 0.408 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2001 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes all Africans between 20 
and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wages and hours of work data, and the data are weighted using 2001 Census 
weights. The dependent variable is log of real hourly wages. The standard errors are shown in brackets below the estimates. 
The base category for occupation is managers. The ‘Other’ category is excluded from the estimation. The province results 
have been omitted from the table and are available on request. 
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Table 3A: Recentred Influence Function (RIF) -Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results, 2005 
 






















































 (0.0132) (0.0173) (0.00885) (0.00926) (0.00739) (0.00813) (0.00855) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0162) 
Professionals 0.333 -0.0633 0.361** -0.0361 0.355** 0.0379 0.941*** 0.140 4.162*** 3.561*** 























Professional (0.224) (0.122) (0.146) (0.0832) (0.142) (0.173) (0.230) (0.349) (0.503) (1.128) 
Clerks 0.372* -0.307* 0.271* -0.188** 0.179 -0.127 0.0111 -0.369 -0.422 -1.612 























 (0.241) (0.166) (0.150) (0.0978) (0.144) (0.181) (0.227) (0.353) (0.457) (1.075) 
Skilled Agric. -0.299 -0.360 -0.393 -0.692** -0.473** -1.002*** -0.625* -1.853*** -1.220** -3.175*** 
& Fisheries (0.420) (0.502) (0.244) (0.310) (0.216) (0.266) (0.326) (0.433) (0.493) (1.072) 
Craft & Trade 0.138 -0.314 -0.147 -0.274** -0.349** -0.400** -1.008*** -1.253*** -1.453*** -2.915*** 





































































 (0.232) (0.147) (0.150) (0.0898) (0.144) (0.177) (0.225) (0.343) (0.452) (1.068) 
Married 0.0277 -0.0869 0.0162 -0.0270 0.0723** 0.0229 0.140*** 0.0413 0.0741 -0.0358 
 (0.0663) (0.0845) (0.0423) (0.0478) (0.0362) (0.0446) (0.0475) (0.0649) (0.0696) (0.102) 
Experience 0.0293* 0.0653*** 0.0186** 0.0288*** 0.00961 0.0273*** 0.0122 0.0297*** 0.0296** 0.0247 























 (0.000352) (0.000460) (0.000222) (0.000229) (0.000182) (0.000194) (0.000225) (0.000254) (0.000307) (0.000395) 
Constant 0.632** 0.909*** 1.492*** 1.737*** 2.038*** 1.987*** 2.250*** 2.598*** 2.897*** 4.401*** 























R-squared 0.066 0.075 0.131 0.180 0.220 0.245 0.312 0.353 0.378 0.472 
Source: Own calculations using September round of LFS 2001 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes all Africans between 20 
and 50 who are employed and have non-missing wages and hours of work data, and the data are weighted using 2001 Census 
weights. The dependent variable is log of real hourly wages. The standard errors are shown in brackets below the estimates. 
The base category for occupation is managers. The ‘Other’ category is excluded from the estimation. The province results 
have been omitted from the table and are available on request. 
